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NEWS-LETTER

THE ECONOMIC CRISIS PUZZLED PEOPLE

SUPPLEMENT

EXISTENTIALISM
BY
DOROTHY EMMET

THIS IS THE SEASON OF HARVEST Festivals, and in nearly every church in town and country alike and in a large number of schools, the customary fruit, flowers and vegetables are being spread out. A hundred years ago such a festival at this time of year was unknown: now, it draws to churches, even in the middle of cities, congregations as large as at Christmas and Easter. The hymns which are sung at these services, although they are only sung once a year, are probably among the best known and most popular in the hymnbook. The Harvest Festival is scarcely a Christian feast, but it evokes and expresses human thankfulness to God for His gifts in creation. The harvest hymn writers have seized upon the symbolism of harvest to link divine providence with divine judgment, but the cheerful tunes to which their solemn warnings are sung take the sting from the words, and the festival remains a festival, a spontaneous outburst of thanksgiving.

This note of thanksgiving is indeed the one which needs to be struck at this moment when people are beginning to think of the inconveniences and hardships which the winter will undoubtedly bring. The outlook is sombre, but it is not all black. If we make our standard of comparison geographical instead of historical, that is, if we look out on the world instead of looking back on ourselves as we were ten or fifteen years ago, our present national standard of living is very high. Even if we look no further than

the continent of Europe there are few countries in which life is more tolerable for the man with a small salary and for the poor than it is in this country—and this is a more proper comparison than that which tourists often make between what the rich are able to acquire in Great Britain and elsewhere. If the Government cannot distribute wealth fairly because there is none, it has at least gone some way in distributing both the basic necessities and the hardships with equity. " This is probably a greater blessing," writes a News-Letter correspondent, " than anyone imagines, because very few have enough sociology and history to realize what strains a general impoverishment *could* lead to, and what recriminations."

The present economic difficulties which the nation is facing have been so repeatedly referred to as " the crisis " that a change of nomenclature is impossible. But the name is not a good one. Most people have experienced crises in their own lives, and they expect a crisis to be what it is in certain illnesses—short, sharp and decisive. It is difficult for people to believe that a crisis which goes on and on is as serious as something which works up suddenly to a frightening climax. It is also difficult for people to be crisis-minded when they have money in their pockets and the shops are full of goods, or to imagine that the nation is poor when many of the parts of the nation are better fed and clothed than they were ten years ago. All this helps towards the generally prevailing feeling of malaise and bewilderment. There is a great deal of moralizing about the crisis in likely and unlikely places, and much of it adds to the confusion by applying to all aspects of the nation's present position moral arguments and exhortations which belong properly only to some.

Perhaps a rough and ready analysis on the following line may be some help in clarification. Beginning with the general and longer-term factor and proceeding to the particular :—

First. The " cultural crisis " of our technical civilization which, as hardened readers of the Christian News-Letter know, has been a subject of discussion in these pages since the earliest days.

Second. World problems following on the war—famine, destruction, shortages of raw materials, political upheavals.

Third. Problems peculiar to Great Britain.

Of the first the war was not a cause, but was in part a symptom : the problem of men and machines, of small groups face to face with the mass organization to which modern industry tends, would have produced their Grimethorpes, economic crisis or no economic crisis. When it comes to the peculiar difficulties of Great Britain, there is again a mixture of factors. Difficulties created by the war, notably the crisis of man-power and the disappearance of foreign assets are mingled with factors having little or nothing to do with the war, such as the loss of India and the ending of the privileges which accrued from Britain's flying start in the industrial revolution and the race for markets. These gave Britain a place of privilege among the nations, but within the nation itself most of its rewards fell to a minority in the nation, the middle classes.

The three lumps of coal and the three little ships which with such wearisome reiteration warn us that we work or want make it clear enough that much is needed from miners, textile workers and many other workers. The crisis of the middle classes cannot be dramatized. As the chief participants in national privilege they are the chief victims of its loss, and at the same time the decision of the nation to share the hardships in proportion to ability to bear them brings down their standard of living. To accept the first deprivation as inevitable and the second as right, makes a strong moral demand on the middle classes. Meanwhile, Government spokesmen make it more difficult for the middle classes to make the changes in their way of life which these necessities demand. To tell them that the nation does not belong to them might be a justifiable piece of political polemic, but to tell them that they do not belong to the nation is a foolish incitement to non-co-operation in the general effort in which they are a most essential ingredient. For Christians to discover what constitutes a Christian witness for members of the middle classes needs some fresh thinking. But perhaps the most important line of Christian witness is that " a man's (and nation's) life consists not in the abundance of things which he possesses ". That word from Scripture is a dangerous one when used by the affluent in relation to those on the margin of want. Yet, when

used in a nation which is prepared to ensure that reductions fall less heavily on those less able to bear them, it is a true and very searching word from God.

We may part company from some Government spokesmen here, because some of the calls to work harder have contained the implication that any fall in our standard of life on the material level is a disaster. The press have helped in the work of the devil at this point, by an outcry which suggests that the cutting of basic petrol or a diminution in the size of the joint or a shortage of motor cars is a national disaster of the first magnitude. We have a call as Christians to look at these things and to say " even if all these and worse things happen—and go on for many years —what of it ? " In these islands we may well have to adopt a much simpler and in some ways poorer way of life, but it could be a sound and healthy life for all. Much depends on how we accept it.

PUZZLED PEOPLE

The question what resources there are in the nation to rise above its present difficulties is, for all its importance, exceedingly difficult to answer. What ordinary men and women think, whether in fact they have ideals, hopes and loyalties which will carry them through the present day of hardship is a matter on which hundreds have opinions and few have evidence. In order to collect some factual data on such questions, the Ethical Union asked Mass Observation to undertake a survey. This was conducted in an inner Metropolitan borough, and is published under the title *Puzzled People*.[1] It has evidently been widely read and widely commented upon. A London borough which has for many years returned a Communist Member of Parliament is probably not quite typical of London boroughs, and a London borough itself is not by any means England writ small. Yet, allowing for certain distortions, the survey probably provides as good "a study in population attitudes to religion, ethics, progress and politics " (which is its sub-title) as anyone can find.

Perhaps the first thing to be said is that these surveys are new, and therefore there is no genuine standard of comparison with past years. Ordinary people's opinions had no news value until

[1] Gollancz. 7s. 6d.

the coming of the halfpenny press. Prior to that, the people who articulated their opinions were *ipso facto* not ordinary people. The book seems to assume a past in which most people had a personal religious faith, a clear idea of right and wrong, a fairly close association with organized religion and a purposeful way of life. Was this really so? The great mass of people in every age have been dominated by the struggle merely to exist. The question of having a purpose in life hardly occurs to people who have no economic freedom. No doubt children were taught a faith but it did not sink very deep. If a very great number of people have had in the past a closer connection with organized religion than they have to-day, surely this was partly due to the fact that the organized Church met them at so many points, as it performed many of those duties which to-day have been taken over by the State, local authorities and voluntary organizations. Unconsciously, the survey, like much other thinking of its kind, assumes a norm roughly between the great Reform Bill and the outbreak of the 1914 war with which comparison can be made. The editor can just remember church-going before the first world war not a mile from where this survey was made. A vivid impression remains of crowded pews, the stifling atmosphere, the serried ranks of the choir, the loud murmur of the Lord's Prayer, the panic of being lost in the crowd pouring out after morning service, the Sunday School which met in three consecutive sessions because of numbers. There were no Mass Observation interviewers to ask these people why they thronged to this particular church, and probably nothing less than interrogation under deep hypnosis would have been enough to draw out from the subconscious minds of some of these people the extraordinary mixture of motives with which they came. If we go back in history behind the Victorian age, there are plenty of stories of empty churches, priests and ministers complaining of lapsed morality and of unassimilated teaching. The real work of the Church has always been grim and uphill, and the sooner the memories of a time when it was usual rather than unusual to go to church are removed from the minds of Christians, the sooner they will be able to face the future with courage.

But these are only caveats which must be entered when *Puzzled People* is read. They are not a denial of the seriousness

of the situation which the book discloses, both inside and outside the churches. To summarize a report which is already a summary of evidence would be to contort the picture still further, and our readers would be well-advised to read the book itself. In most respects the report only serves to throw further light on already known facts. As, for instance, that there are twice as many non-believers among the under-forties as among the over-forties; that there is still little convinced atheism; that there is a large body of people who suspend judgment on religious issues and that a part of this large majority is to be found among those who do attend church; that there are very few people who think that the keeping of the Ten Commandments is undesirable, and many who think it impossible; that there is widespread and often bitter criticism of organized religion, combined with widespread respect for the person of Christ, including in over 50 per cent of the sample a belief in His divinity. The only surprising facts are the very large proportion of people who think that there should be Christian religious teaching in schools; the very small difference between those who have had a secondary education and those who have not in the matter of joining voluntary associations and taking an interest in responsible activities in the community, and a widespread disillusionment about science and human progress.

There constantly comes out a very powerful underlying conviction that things are going from bad to worse, that mankind is bound for self-destruction and that nobody and nothing can do anything about it. War and the fear of war have paralysed men's thoughts, particularly as they have come on top of sufficient education to make many people self-consciously aware of evils which were perhaps not so much thought about in the previous generation. The report also emphasizes the growth among young people of entirely self-centred as opposed to group-centred conceptions of pleasure. The family is the only enlargement of self-consideration which commands loyalty.

A chapter is given to clergy's views. It makes very depressing reading. In fairness to some of them, we may, perhaps, assume that they did not mean all that appears in print. The attitude *de haut en bas* is still there. The tendency to moralize and generalize, the constant reiteration of "they" think, do, say, believe

this and that, and the discouragement overlaid by cynicism—none of these augur very well for the future of the Church. That a man of education could lay the whole blame for the confusion in people's minds about religion on the Cowper-Temple Clause seems unbelievable.[1]

It is good to set alongside of *Puzzled People* a recent broadsheet published by *Political and Economic Planning*[2] on the new suburb of Watling, where from inauspicious beginnings something of a life of community has been built up in which the Churches have played a considerable part. We cannot agree with Mass Observation in thinking that the moral of their survey is that as Nazism came in to fill the vacuum in Germany, so the presence of doubt and cynicism in this country must give place to some new faith which will be lapped up easily for lack of an alternative. We should have said that the presence of eight million unemployed and the smarting sense of national degradation through defeat were as strong, or stronger, factors in the rise of Hitler than the weakening of Christian faith. In many respects, indeed, Germany was a more " Christian " country than our own. To turn attention to the possibility of some new faith coming in and claiming the allegiance of these people is to turn away attention from the fact that apathy, and all that goes with it in the way of retreating within the individual person, casting off larger responsibilities and suspending judgment on every doubtful issue, can itself be a way of living.

THE SUPPLEMENT

Miss Dorothy Emmet, who writes our Supplement, is Professor of Philosophy in the University of Manchester. Her recent book, *The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking*,[3] attracted widespread attention. Readers may be interested to know that M. Gabriel Marcel, the distinguished French Catholic existentialist, hopes to visit this country in the autumn and will deliver two lectures at St. Anne's House, 57A Dean Street, W. 1, on October 29th and November 5th, at 6 p.m.

Kathleen Bliss

[1] Pages 88-9. [2] No. 270, Aug. 15, 1947. [3] Macmillans. 10s. 6d.

EXISTENTIALISM

By DOROTHY EMMET

"EXISTENTIALISM" is becoming something of a blessed word. From the Third Programme to the literary and theological reviews, it is constantly cropping up; and we hear reports of Existentialist lectures in France drawing huge audiences. A colleague of mine, a Professor of French Studies, when on a recent visit to the United States, was asked by the official at the customs whether he was going to lecture on Existentialism. When he said, "No," the official said, "That's all right," and passed him through without further examination.

No one would have been more surprised than the father of Existentialism if he could have seen this progeny. For Existentialism derives from Kierkegaard's use of the word *Existenz*, to mean "existence" in the special sense in which human individuals are said to exist, and no one was more of a foreigner to "isms" and fashionable movements of thought than Kierkegaard. Working in Denmark 100 years ago, he was almost unknown except as a local eccentric in Copenhagen. He was a lonely free lance, poet, philosopher, theologian, pouring out his voluminous writings in a continual attempt to ask and answer the question: What does it mean to be a Christian? and to show, not without irony, that his contemporaries were asking and answering it in the wrong way.

KIERKEGAARD AND THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC

The dominant philosophy on the continent at the time was Hegelian Idealism, and followers of this philosophy believed they had found a system in terms of which satisfactory theoretical and practical answers could be found to the main problems of human life and destiny. The leading idea of this system was that of a dialectical process of thought. When we are thinking or arguing we come to points where we seem to be up against a contradiction: one side maintains one idea, the "thesis", the other its opposite, the "anti-

thesis ". But on further examination it is sometimes possible to show that these opposing ideas are not really mutually contradictory, but complementary. By finding an idea which will include the contribution of both sides, they can be reconciled in a " higher synthesis ". Of course in some kinds of argument or debate a dialectic like this is the real method of advance. But if we are always trying to show that " either-ors " can be converted into " both-ands " we can end in a series of ingenious attempts to eat our cake and have it. Also the Hegelian Dialectic was not only a logic of argument, but a metaphysical theory according to which the process of the world itself was looked on as the expression of a Thought which moved according to this pattern of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. Hence in the world when properly understood, we ought to be able to see that conflicts are always necessary stages towards creative reconciliation ; that there are no exclusive choices or real alternatives.

Against all this, Kierkegaard maintained that you could have a system of ideas but not a system of existence ; that thought might be full of syntheses, but life was full of choices ; and that a thinker is not an incarnation of a general, absolute consciousness, but an individual subject. To the Hegelian there was a solution in each situation which was the realization of the " absolute Idea " (that is, the Thought behind the world process) in the conditions of that situation, and freedom and rationality were to be found in recognizing and accepting the necessity of that solution. But to Kierkegaard there was " an absolute qualitative distinction between God and man ". He was always saying that " the absolute had gone out of life " ; that people had reduced the idea of absolute perfection to something which could be achieved in the actual conditions of human life. But if we understand the limitations and frustrations inherent in our situation as finite human individuals we shall see that absolute perfection must be beyond us, and so we shall have " the edification of the thought that before God we are always in the wrong ". (Readers of Reinhold Niebuhr will recognize a kinship with what he says about " impossible possibilities ".)

DECISION

But if there is always a break between the transcendent absolute and finite human life, and if therefore there are no completely satisfactory answers to our theoretical and practical problems, this only serves to sharpen our need to make personal choices and decisions. And these will be real choices, difficult choices between conflicting possibilities, which can never be fully justified on objective grounds. This call to make choices and decisions by which we commit ourselves is the special characteristic of human existence, and it is from this that the name "Existentialism" is derived. We become human beings by facing and assuming the responsibility for making decisions, above all in those difficult and critical situations in which there is no way of demonstrating whether we are deciding rightly, and when we have to act in faith. "How do we *know* what the will of God really is ?" an earnest student once asked Father Kelly at Swanwick, and he answered, "We don't, and that 's the giddy joke". To the existentialists all the more important questions we ask in trying to understand the world, as well as in seeking what we ought to do, are caught in this giddy joke. Abraham, the father of those who live by faith, should therefore be the father of us all. But it is a kind of faith which is very close to scepticism ; and Existentialism may be, but is not necessarily, Christian. There are Catholic and Protestant existentialists: there were Nazi existentialists and existentialists in the Resistance Movements ; and the contemporary French Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre is strongly atheistic. The need to make responsible individual decisions does not imply that everyone will decide in the same way—quite the contrary.

"ANGST"

The preliminary stage leading to these different kinds of Existentialism is however the same ; it is realizing what Kierkegaard called *Angest*, in German *Angst*. We have no English word which quite translates it. "Anxiety" sounds too fussy. One of Berdyaev's English translators renders it "Holy Terror", but to some of us this phrase has slightly

comic associations. What the word expresses is the sense of a fundamental metaphysical insecurity; not dread of anything in particular, but the dread which comes over us if we realize that in the last resort the moral and theoretical props by which we have supported ourselves go down, and we are faced with—*Nothingness*. Some existentialists, notably Heidegger in Germany and J.-P. Sartre, make a great deal of this contention that the final metaphysical fact is Nothingness, and this part of their writings becomes extremely complicated. Mr. A. J. Ayer (writing in *Horizon*, July and August, 1945) has in fact called it " a systematic abuse of the verb to be ". And some of us who do not share Mr. Ayer's positivist views may yet find ourselves tempted to call down on the heads of the existentialists the curses which the ancient Parmenides directed at those who tried to say that " Not-Being is ".

I myself believe that it comes to something like this. When people talk about reality (especially if written " Reality ") they generally mean not just that there is something which is the case, but that there is something which is important or significant. When they talk about " unreality ", they mean a final sense of triviality or meaninglessness—that nothing really matters. So when existentialists speak of being faced with " Nothingness " they do not mean that whatever was the case in the world has just silently vanished away like the Snark; they mean that we come up against a final sense of meaninglessness. This comes when we see through the theories, the inherited traditions, the clichés, which had concealed our fundamental ignorance and insecurity.

RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR EXISTENTIALISM

But here the religious and secular existentialists diverge. Both kinds see themselves as human beings, caught in all kinds of relativities, in a world in which there is no final security in either theoretical systems or moral laws, and yet a world in which we have a responsibility. But the religious existentialist believes that the " Nothingness " with which he is confronted marks the breakdown of his theoretical

systems. Behind it is God, albeit the hidden God; and although he knows that whatever he thinks and whatever he does will have a catch in it somewhere, he can throw himself on the mercy of the hidden God. The secular existentialist has no such final justification by faith. He is left with a responsibility for action and decision, an absolute responsibility, in a world in which there is no security and no centre beyond himself. Hence the secular existentialist is thinking in what are really religious categories of guilt, dereliction, freedom and responsibility; but thinking in them in a world in which he takes seriously Nietzche's saying that *God is dead.*

Most atheists, he will tell us, have not taken it seriously. They have not realized that they are living in a world which is ultimately meaningless, and yet one in which we have the responsibility of freedom, of decision. They have protected themselves with some philosophy of naturalistic determination or of inevitable progress. And others are not willing to face this lonely responsibility. They cling to clichés and traditional opinions, letting their decisions be dictated for them by the impersonal force of what "they say"—the crowd mind which is in all of us, and which Heidegger calls *das Man.* Heidegger goes so far as to describe Conscience exclusively in terms of the contrast between the voice of *das Man* in us and the readiness of the individual to break with it and make personal decisions for which he takes responsibility. And since such a break always, he thinks, brings a feeling of guilt, the authentic conscience will always be the guilty and not the good conscience.

Conscience is the willingness of the individual to come out from the crowd mind (which includes our normal moral codes) and realize his selfhood in making first-hand decisions.

Some of this language reminds us of the Japanese student who said: "Christian morality no good for go-ahead nation. So hurrah for Self-realization and Thomas Hill Green." But some of the decisions in which modern existentialists realize themselves would make the respectable shade of T. H. Green turn in his grave, as would no doubt

also the efforts after self-realization of his Japanese disciple. For whereas to Green and the Idealists self-realization was the coming to consciousness in an individual of a universal moral will, the existentialist is thrown back on a much more subjective kind of freedom and responsibility. It is a freedom to be found in making decisions which somehow engage our whole nature—but what is our nature, and what are we really like? We can try and discover by a process of deep self-analysis. But we are always discovering in the act of making decisions that we are not really the kind of people we thought we were (Sartre makes much of this point, that we never catch up on our ideas of ourselves). So we are continually frustrated by things inside us as well as outside us. The final frustration is Death, which will defeat our attempts to realize freedom, except (Heidegger suggests) in so far as through facing the fact of death we gain a certain tragic superiority.

So the secular no less than the religious existentialists picture man as a being faced with infinite demands which in the nature of the case cannot be fulfilled in the conditions of our finite existence.[1] Sartre says, "l'homme est condamné à être libre", and Kierkegaard said, "Only omnipotence can set people free". Their writings might be taken as series of variations on these two themes. Sartre's long philosophical novel *Les Chemins de la Liberté* is a kind of atheistic existential Pilgrim's Progress. In the first part, *L'age de la Raison*, we see how the chief character, Matthieu Delarue, cannot be free because of his lack of conviction, and his involvements with other people and the sordid muddles which he makes of them.

In the second part *Le Sursis* ("The Respite") we see the effects of Munich on Matthieu and all sorts of other people in France, who had not faced the real possibility of war and were still not facing it. In the part to come, shall we see the discovery of the reality of the War and the Occupation making possible for people some kind of "total engage-

[1] Is it unkind to suggest as suitable for an existentialist the epitaph of the Young Lady who always was tired, for she lived in a world in which too much was required?

ment " or self-committal ? For Sartre is reported to have said, " We were never so free as under the Occupation." He probably meant that in the Resistance Movement people found themselves in situations where the ordinary moral codes failed them, but where they were faced with the need to make difficult and sometimes terrible decisions. And if they had the courage to make them, they discovered something of the possibility of inner " existential " liberty.

EXISTENTIALISM AND MORAL EXPERIENCE

What of this existentialist analysis of moral experience ? Is the first moral question: " How can I be free ? " or is it rather: " What ought I to do ? " Is there a real difference between the person who is primarily asking himself (in a difficult situation) what ought he to do, realizing that he has obligations to other people, and the person who is primarily asking himself how he can realize his freedom through making a first-hand personal decision ? The existentialists are surely right in calling attention to the element of faith and personal decision in any difficult moral situation, particularly when the ordinary sign-posts are down and the ordinary codes fail to guide. But I think the existentialists tend to make the achievement of freedom through decision into an end in itself, so that it tends to become something rather abstract. Thus they sometimes use language which suggests that it does not much matter what you choose, so long as you have the courage to choose and not to rat on it. But a decision is only a responsible decision when it is the outcome of an honest struggle to perceive and know what things we ought to do. There is no text book in which we can look up the answers and we have no assurance that we shall not make mistakes. But I believe that to find the essence of Conscience in readiness to break with the moral traditions and principles of society is only a half truth. It is to identify principles with conventions ; and although it may indeed be true that no principles hold absolutely in all circumstances, yet I believe we should turn more hairs in breaking them than existentialist views of morality admit, and only so can we look for growth in moral wisdom. Perhaps this is why

Existentialism seems more adequate as a philosophy of rebellion than of construction; in the days of the Resistance in France, where the qualities called for were courage and the willingness to do terrible things, than now in the days of reconstruction, where what is called for is often honesty and faithfulness in pegging away at a job of work. Perhaps in this way Existentialism expresses the tortured mind of an age in which to many people any kind of steady construction or growth seems impossible.

POSITIVE ELEMENTS

But I believe that it is more than just this. Existentialists have been right in pointing to the element of faith and personal decision in the things which most concern us in morality and in philosophy. They are also right in bringing out the fact that these decisions have to be made in our very ambiguous world, in which there are no ideal solutions, and in which whatever we do will have snags in it somewhere. This is part of our finitude, which to the irreligious may spell frustration, and to the religious may be part of what can be called " creatureliness ". The religious existentialist acknowledges a claim of the Absolute upon him, and interprets it as the Hidden God ; but he knows he must act largely in the dark ; and that there are no tram lines and no text-book answers. The secular existentialist interprets the claim as a call of himself to himself to realize responsible freedom in a world in which there is no security and no authority beyond his own decision. Between these two there is a great gulf fixed ; nevertheless in contemporary Existentialism a situation has been produced in which believers and unbelievers can talk to one another in terms of common assumptions. For the existential atheism differs from the atheism which often goes along with materialist philosophy, in being a sense of the *absence* of God, an intellectual and spiritual dereliction in which it is possible to see a religious value. I believe that there are groups in France where Catholics, Protestants, people sharing the outlook of Martin Buber, and existential atheists can meet and find that they are living in the same perspective and asking the same questions.

Possibly someone who has, as I have not, some knowledge of these groups, could write about them for the C.N-L.

NOTE ON LITERATURE

There is no general book on Existentialism in English. Those interested in Kierkegaard are advised to eschew the small guides and to work their way gradually into his writings (a long job !) with the help of Lowrie's biographical introduction (*Kierkegaard*, O.U.P.). Sartre is best approached through his novels and plays. There are two critical articles on him by A. J. Ayer (*Horizon*, July and August, 1945). His short *L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme* is a good summary of his main beliefs. Another leading existentialist is Gabriel Marcel, a Catholic, whose *Journal Métaphysique* (written during and soon after the last war) follows a line of its own. He believes in the possibility of mystical contact with God, other minds, and nature in a way foreign to the loveless and frustrated world of some contemporary existentialists. In Germany, Professor Jaspers of Heidelberg holds a central position between secular and Christian existentialists. Heidegger is a radical secular existentialist. None of their books has been translated, except Jaspers' *Die Geistige Situation der Zeit* as " Man in the Modern Age ". But the translation is not very reliable or readable. De Ruggiero's *Existentialism* is a critical essay from the standpoint of a liberal neo-Hegelian Idealism. The translation has been edited and introduced by Rayner Heppenstall (Secker and Warburg).

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